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Videos uploaded by user “Florence School of Banking and Finance”
The Process of Sovereign Debt Restructuring - Lee Buchheit (Part 1)
 
27:01
Lecture by Lee C. Buchheit (Clearly Gottlieb Steel & Hamilton LLP). Recorded at the training course 'Managing and Understanding Sovereign Debt Risks and Restructuring' by the Florence School of Banking and Finance - Florence, 24 April 2018 http://fbf.eui.eu/managing-understanding-sovereign-risks/
The liquidity crisis in Greece | Evi Pappa
 
06:21
Evi Pappa, Macroeconomics Professor at the European University Institute and a Greek national talks to Nicholas Barrett about the liquidity crisis, her recent trip home and the haircut we won't even realise. Recorded 8 July 2015, Florence Italy.
The completion of the Banking Union | Mario Nava - European Commission
 
03:51
April 2015 In the context of the conference on “The new financial architecture in the Eurozone”, at the European University Institute, 23 April 2015 Mario Nava Director D Regulation and prudential supervision of financial institutions at DG FISMA - European Commission speaks about the completion of the Banking Union.
The Process of Sovereign Debt Restructuring - Lee Buchheit (Part 2)
 
37:20
Lecture by Lee C. Buchheit (Clearly Gottlieb Steel & Hamilton LLP). Recorded at the training course 'Managing and Understanding Sovereign Debt Risks and Restructuring' by the Florence School of Banking and Finance - Florence, 24 April 2018 http://fbf.eui.eu/managing-understanding-sovereign-risks/
Starting-up the Single Resolution Mechanism: Talking to Mauro Grande (Single Resolution Board)
 
07:06
We interviewed Mauro Grande, who sits on the Single Resolution Board. We asked him how the Single Resolution Mechanism would work and who would have the final say in the event of a crisis. - What is the single resolution mechanism? - Will the single resolution board be ready in 2016? - What is the bridge financing mechanism? - Who has the final word on the single resolution process? - What does the SRB do when there is no crisis?
The new system of banking supervision for Europe | Ignazio Angeloni - Supervisory Board of the ECB
 
03:26
April 2015 In the context of the conference on “The new financial architecture in the Eurozone”, at the European University Institute, 23 April 2015 Ignazio Angeloni, speaks about his new role as Member of the Supervisory Board of the European Central Bank and the challenges to make the new banking supervision work but also what are the resources the new supervisory architecture can build upon.
The Chinese Slowdown: A Risk to European Banks? | Piers Haben - European Banking Authority
 
05:10
Nicholas Barrett asks Piers Haben, Director of Oversight at the European Banking Authority (EBA), about the risks of diminished Chinese growth and whether he's ready for the consequences. To what extent will the great stall of China test our banks and their new supervisory regime?
Is the Euro a Scapegoat? | Martin Sandbu
 
07:03
Martin Sandbu is the author of Europe's Orphan: The Future of the Euro and the Politics of Debt. He also writes the daily Free Lunch column for the Financial Times. Here he talks to Nicholas Barrett about the future of the single currency. https://www.amazon.co.uk/Europe%252019s-Orphan-Future-Euro-Politics/dp/069116830X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1463052802&sr=8-1&keywords=sandbu
Stress Testing in Europe : A Primer
 
01:07:11
Speakers: - Mario Quagliariello (Director of the Economic Analysis and Statistics Department, European Banking Authority) - Klaus Düllmann (Head of SSM Risk Analysis Division, European Central Bank) More information here: http://fbf.eui.eu/event/online-seminar-stress-testing-in-europe-a-primer/ Stress testing – understood as a tool for assessing banks’ resilience to an extreme but plausible adverse scenario – is a crucial part of banking supervisors' toolbox. In this online seminar, Mario Quagliariello and Klaus Düllmann will: - guide you through the rationale and objectives of the European Union wide stress test simulation exercise; - highlight its governance and underline its key features; - lastly, our speakers will also showcase results and share their lessons learned from the most recent EU stress testing exercise.
The Changing Geography of Finance and Regulation in Europe
 
04:54
Free download of the ebook: http://cadmus.eui.eu//handle/1814/47745 This book discusses how the regulatory framework should respond to the profound changes which are impacting the world’s financial architecture, including the advent of innovative technologies, collectively known as FinTech, the issues related to regulatory arbitrage and the impact of Brexit on the European landscape. This publication contains the proceedings of the conference 'The Changing Geography of Finance and Regulation in Europe', which was held at the EUI in Florence, Italy, on 27 April 2017.
Banking Union in the global world | Andrea Enria - European Banking Authority
 
03:28
Andrea Enria | Chairperson at the European Banking Authority in the context of the European University Institute's State of the Union speaks about the challenges to speak with a unified voice in the global world of banking and finance. Fine the recording of the debate here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2OefZ8oAi30
Talking One's Way Out of a Debt Crisis | Lee Buchheit
 
06:40
Lee C. Buchheit is the author of How to Negotiate Eurocurrency Loan Agreements and Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will. During his recent visit to Florence, he spoke to Nicholas Barrett about his latest paper 'Talking One's Way Out of a Debt Crisis' and European debt restructuring. Buchheit's paper: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2772658
Resolution Planning in Practice - Seminar with Mauro Grande and Sophie Steins Bisshop (SRB)
 
57:50
Recording of the online seminar held on the 4th of October 2017, organised by the Florence School of Banking and Finance. Speakers: Mauro Grande (Member of the Single Resolution Board) Sophie Steins Bisschop (Single Resolution Board, Directorate for Resolution Strategy, Processes and Methodology) Moderator: Pierre Schlosser (Florence School of Banking and Finance) Resolution planning is at the heart of Europe’s new banking resolution regime and is a central power of resolution authorities. Yet, how resolution plans are prepared, discussed and implemented remains poorly understood, both in policy-making and in academic circles. Against this background, this online seminar will provide a strategic overview of the essential and constitutive steps of the resolution planning process and will offer a solid understanding of new fundamental notions which are too often taken for granted such as for example the ‘preferred resolution strategy’, ‘critical functions’, ‘resolution tools’ and the ‘resolvability assessment’. More specifically, the seminar will address the following questions: what are the steps the Single Resolution Board (SRB) takes in developing resolution plans? How are the critical functions identified? What are the key elements of the resolvability assessment? http://fbf.eui.eu/event/online-seminar-resolution-planning-practice/
Christos Hadjiemmanuil | London School of Economics
 
01:18
The new financial architecture in the Eurozone - Conference at the European University Institute - Florence School of Banking and Finance 23rd April 2015
Fiscal and Monetary Policies after the Crises | Isabel Correia -Bank of Portugal
 
04:33
In the context of the COEURE workshop on Fiscal and Monetary Policies after the Crises, - Isabel Correia | Bank of Portugal - John Hassler | Stockholm University speak about research on EU economic policy done after the financial crisis and whether we have better tools today to understand its origins and how to address these or whether there are still important knowledge gaps we need to fill, as to better support policy-makers to design financial and monetary policy. COEURE PROJECT [ LINK: http://www.coeure.eu/] The COEURE Coordination Action (which stands for COoperation for EUropean REsearch in Economics) brings together the key stakeholders in the European economic research space – funders, policy-makers and researchers – in a process of stocktaking, consultation and stakeholder collaboration. The aim of this process is to identify the knowledge gaps on key EU economic policy issues and assess the current challenges and opportunities facing European-based researchers, with the ultimate goal to inform the European agenda for research funding. COEURE is funded by the FP7 SSH research programme and it is coordinated by the European Economic Association. COEURE workshop on Fiscal and Monetary Policies after the Crises LINK http://www.eui.eu/DepartmentsAndCentres/Economics/SeminarsEvents/Conferences/COEUREWorkshoponFiscalandMonetaryPoliciesAfterTheCrises.aspx Organised by Prof. Giancarlo Corsetti - University of Cambridge Prof. Ramon Marimon – European University Institute
Was the Eurozone crisis inevitable? | Ramon Marimon - European University Institute
 
10:48
Prior to the Greek referendum, Nicholas Barrett asks Professor Ramon Marimon (Professor of Economics at the European University Institute and Scientific Coordinator of the Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Action “A Dynamic Economic and Monetary Union" (ADEMU) about the implications of the Greek debt crisis and his project, ADEMU (A Dynamic Economic and Monetary Union) http://ademu-project.eu/ ADEMU brings together eight research groups from leading European institutions: Barcelona Graduate School of Economics Catholic University of Portugal Charles University in Prague European University Institute Toulouse School of Economics University College London University of Bonn University of Cambridge
Empirical Methods to Evaluate Financial Regulation | Steven Ongena
 
01:08
Steven Ongena (University of Zurich), speaker at the Florence School of Banking and Finance's training course 'Empirical Methods to Evaluate Financial Regulation'. Video taken at the European University Institute - Villa Schifanoia, Florence. For more information about this course please visit: http://fbf.eui.eu/event/empirical-methods-evaluate-financial-regulation/
European Banking Union Democracy, Technocracy and ... | Erik Jones - SAIS
 
01:07
Conference at the European University Institute on European Banking Union: Democracy, Technocracy and the State of Integration Scientific Organisers: Pepper D. Culpepper, Stefan Grundmann, Adrienne Héritier, Hans-W. Micklitz European University Institute Sala Europa, Villa Schifanoia Via Boccaccio, 121 – Firenze 22-23 May 2015 ■ Context In 2012, at the height of the sovereign debt crisis, European decision makers decided that the next step in developing an ever closer union involved the formation of banking union (BU). Now that the banking union has taken shape, this conference will bring together social scientists from several disciplines to discuss the nature of the political processes that gave rise to the banking union. Which players were involved, and with what consequences, in the different stages of the decision-making process? To what extent has there been a trade-off between efficient problem solving, on the one hand, and democratic legitimation through an open political process, on the other? One important goal of the reform was to break the dangerous link between government debt and national banks buying government bonds to finance this debt. In June 2014 member states and the European Parliament decided to create a single resolution mechanism (SRM), the second building block of the BU, after the first step of the single supervision mechanism (SSM) had been introduced in 2013 to create a unified system to handle banks in crisis. The political decision-making that resulted in the two mechanisms involved difficult bargaining between governments with diverging preferences, particularly with respect to the mutual insurance of bank deposits in case of bank failure, but also as regards the distribution of decision-making competences under both the SSM and the SRM. Three conflicts of interest emerged: between debtor and creditor states; between member states favouring a centralization of competences and member states resisting centralization in the supervision and resolution; and between stakeholders of banks and of governments trying to protect the interests of taxpayers. Understanding how the institutional arrangements adopted reflect these tensions, and how these tensions are likely to influence the future functioning of the BU, is a central intellectual concern of the conference. A second major theme is the relationship between technocratic governance and democratic oversight. The SSM was introduced on the basis of a unanimity vote of member states. The European Parliament gave its support after it had been granted more powers than originally envisaged over the appointment of top officials at the new single supervisor and after obtaining better access to information from the ECB in its supervision of banks. In the case of the resolution of failing banks, the decision-process still significantly involves national decision-makers. Burden sharing in rescuing or resolving a failed bank has been watered down. While bail-in rules will first burden bond-holders with more costs of a failure, in a further step member governments will be financially responsible. The mutual rescue fund of 55 billion Euros is relatively small and will be built up over 8 years. The upshot of the modest SRM compromise is that the ECB is indirectly gaining more competences, because it is under more pressure to correctly assess banks balance sheets in the supervision of banks so that they can withstand another shock. The organization of the panels draws on the specific expertise of invited participants to shed light on these general issues at the intersection of law, politics, and economics. A first panel focuses on technocratic and centralized decision making in the BU, emphasizing the process and its particular constitutive element for the building of a new European banking union. The second session considers the inherent constitutional dimension of the project, comparing the BU as a step of constitutionalisation to the EU constitution building after the establishment of the competition order in the 1960s and 1970s. The two afternoon panels on Friday look into the overall systemic impact of the deepening of integration through the BU: what are the consequences for the overall institutional architecture of the EU, in particular as regards the democratic legitimation in the EU? The Saturday panel returns to how the political play of power in building the BU will influence its likely functioning, and the final roundtable takes two different disciplinary perspectives to anticipate the future functioning and potential dysfunctions of the banking union.
Andrea Enria | European Banking Authority
 
00:46
Andrea Enria | Chairperson at the European Banking Authority welcomes the creation of the Florence School of Banking & Finance at the European University Institute.
Lucia Quaglia hints at ‘a convoluted decision-making process’ on banking resolution
 
05:50
http://fbf.eui.eu/ Speaking on the sidelines of a talk given at Scuola Normale Superiore in Palazzo Strozzi (Florence), Lucia Quaglia, Professor of Political Science at the University of York (UK) reviewed the entangled governance of the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), and stressed that ‘the most convoluted part of the process is how to take decisions within the Single Resolution Board’. More specifically, Quaglia pointed at the number of policy actors involved in the process and concluded that, going forward, there could be some ‘lack of clarity as to who is responsible’. Professor Quaglia also examined the intricacies of the UK’s position on the EU Banking Union. Going beyond the obvious political reason why the UK is not part of the Banking Union (the UK decided not to join EMU in 1999), she also underscored the chief importance of economic factors and in particular the structure of the EU banking system in explaining the reluctance of the UK to join the SRM: the UK’s banking system ‘is a system that is very internationalized rather than just Europeanized’. Putting things in the larger perspective of open economies facing interdependence pressures, Lucia Quaglia went on and explained that ‘by and large, all countries regardless whether they are in the euro area or even in the European Union, face what some economists call a financial trilemma, between the stability of the financial sector, international financial integration and national policies for the regulation, resolution and supervision of banks’. An additional constraint for euro area countries, she added, is that ‘the lender of last resort is no longer at the national level but hasn’t really been moved to the EU level’. “The decision-making process on resolution – within the Single Resolution Mechanism – is indeed very convoluted. There are several different policy actors involved, the ECB, the Commission, the Single Resolution Board, national resolution authorities and also the Council of Ministers. I think that there can potentially be some lack of clarity as to who is responsible, who is actually taking the final decision”
The SSM approach to tackling NPLs: progress made and challenges ahead
 
01:00:06
Speakers: - Ignazio Angeloni, Member of the Supervisory Board of the European Central Bank - Sharon Finn, Advisor on Credit Risk & NPLs, SSM - Anne Fröhling, Head of Section, SSM - Giuseppe Siani, Deputy Director General of Microprudential Supervision IV, SSM Recording of the online seminar on 19 September 2018. Tackling NPLs has been one of the SSM priorities since its set up. NPLs weigh on banks’ balance sheets, impact on their profitability and divert resources from more proactive use. To this end the SSM has developed a comprehensive strategy to tackle NPLs which requires complementary actions from other EU stakeholders. The seminar will present the supervisory actions taken, outline the results achieved so far, and discuss the challenges ahead.
European Banking Union Democracy, Technocracy ... | Niamh Moloney - LSE
 
01:37
Conference at the European University Institute on European Banking Union: Democracy, Technocracy and the State of Inte gration Scientific Organisers: Pepper D. Culpepper, Stefan Grundmann, Adrienne Héritier, Hans-W. Micklitz European University Institute Sala Europa, Villa Schifanoia Via Boccaccio, 121 – Firenze 22-23 May 2015 ■ Context In 2012, at the height of the sovereign debt crisis, European decision makers decided that the next step in developing an ever closer union involved the formation of banking union (BU). Now that the banking union has taken shape, this conference will bring together social scientists from several disciplines to discuss the nature of the political processes that gave rise to the banking union. Which players were involved, and with what consequences, in the different stages of the decision-making process? To what extent has there been a trade-off between efficient problem solving, on the one hand, and democratic legitimation through an open political process, on the other? One important goal of the reform was to break the dangerous link between government debt and national banks buying government bonds to finance this debt. In June 2014 member states and the European Parliament decided to create a single resolution mechanism (SRM), the second building block of the BU, after the first step of the single supervision mechanism (SSM) had been introduced in 2013 to create a unified system to handle banks in crisis. The political decision-making that resulted in the two mechanisms involved difficult bargaining between governments with diverging preferences, particularly with respect to the mutual insurance of bank deposits in case of bank failure, but also as regards the distribution of decision-making competences under both the SSM and the SRM. Three conflicts of interest emerged: between debtor and creditor states; between member states favouring a centralization of competences and member states resisting centralization in the supervision and resolution; and between stakeholders of banks and of governments trying to protect the interests of taxpayers. Understanding how the institutional arrangements adopted reflect these tensions, and how these tensions are likely to influence the future functioning of the BU, is a central intellectual concern of the conference. A second major theme is the relationship between technocratic governance and democratic oversight. The SSM was introduced on the basis of a unanimity vote of member states. The European Parliament gave its support after it had been granted more powers than originally envisaged over the appointment of top officials at the new single supervisor and after obtaining better access to information from the ECB in its supervision of banks. In the case of the resolution of failing banks, the decision-process still significantly involves national decision-makers. Burden sharing in rescuing or resolving a failed bank has been watered down. While bail-in rules will first burden bond-holders with more costs of a failure, in a further step member governments will be financially responsible. The mutual rescue fund of 55 billion Euros is relatively small and will be built up over 8 years. The upshot of the modest SRM compromise is that the ECB is indirectly gaining more competences, because it is under more pressure to correctly assess banks balance sheets in the supervision of banks so that they can withstand another shock. The organization of the panels draws on the specific expertise of invited participants to shed light on these general issues at the intersection of law, politics, and economics. A first panel focuses on technocratic and centralized decision making in the BU, emphasizing the process and its particular constitutive element for the building of a new European banking union. The second session considers the inherent constitutional dimension of the project, comparing the BU as a step of constitutionalisation to the EU constitution building after the establishment of the competition order in the 1960s and 1970s. The two afternoon panels on Friday look into the overall systemic impact of the deepening of integration through the BU: what are the consequences for the overall institutional architecture of the EU, in particular as regards the democratic legitimation in the EU? The Saturday panel returns to how the political play of power in building the BU will influence its likely functioning, and the final roundtable takes two different disciplinary perspectives to anticipate the future functioning and potential dysfunctions of the banking union.
Lost in TLAC - Seminar by Tobias Tröger
 
54:48
Recording of the online seminar held on the 18th of January 2017, organised by the Florence School of Banking and Finance. Speaker: Tobias Tröger (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt) Moderator: Pierre Schlosser (Florence School of Banking and Finance) A key policy consequence drawn from the great financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 has been to compel private sector loss participation in case of a bank’s failure. Not only would such a bail-in of investors in banks spare tax payers but also re-instill market discipline by undoing implicit government guarantees. A crucial precondition for this strategy is that banks exhibit sufficient loss bearing capacity. Regulators both globally and in Europe thus prescribe minimum standards for the amount and quality of loss bearing capital to be held by banks. This online seminar looks at the crucial features of the requirements of the Financial Stability Board’s Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) requirements with a particular view to the Minimum Requirement for own Funds and Eligible Liabilities (MREL) prescriptions in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and highlights some important implementation issues. http://fbf.eui.eu/event/lost-tlac-online-seminar/
Venezuela’s ‘Hunger’ Bonds - Seminar with Mitu Gulati and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
 
01:04:56
Recording of the online seminar held on the 25th of January 2017, organised by the Florence School of Banking and Finance. Speakers: Mitu Gulati (Professor of Law at Duke University) Jeromin Zettelmeyer (Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute of International Economics) Moderator: Pierre Schlosser (Florence School of Banking and Finance) An age-old question in international finance and law, dating back at least to the days of the Czar is: what happens when a country leadership chooses to favor the interests of foreign bondholders over those of its local population, using despotic means? Does the local population, after the leadership has been removed, have to continue paying these “odious” debts? Today, the question is being posed to the international community, front and center, in the context of the Venezuelan debt crisis, where an anti-democratic leadership continues to favor the interests of foreign bondholders over a deprived local population. Those questions as well as the relevance of such a debate in a European context – where debt restructuring is regularly popping up and off the policy agenda – were be answered in this online seminar by sovereign debt scholars, Mitu Gulati (Duke University) and Jeromin Zettelmeyer (Peterson Institute for International Economics) who will also bring contrasting perspectives from international law and economics. http://fbf.eui.eu/event/online-seminar-venezuelas-hunger-bonds/
Bank Lending in The Age of Digital Disruption
 
01:09:01
Speakers: Jean Dermine (Professor of Banking and Finance, INSEAD) Giacomo Calzolari (Professor of Economics, University of Bologna) Recording of the online seminar on 22 May 2018. Digital technologies are disrupting the world of banking and finance. Their advent visibly results in new opportunities. However, digital banking may also bring along new threats. Against the background of a long series of financial and technological innovations, this online seminar will focus on the economics of banking services in the new digital age. Jean Dermine (INSEAD) concentrates on banks’ two main functions – the provision of liquidity and the provision of loans – and will ask whether these services could be displaced by peer-to-peer and marketplace lending. Dermine in particular assesses one segment of digital disruption, peer-to-peer (P2P) lending. The case of Lending Club, the emblematic leader of the US P2P sector will help to anchor the discussion on real-life issues and to anticipate likely developments in the globalized industry. In his talk he will also engage with contemporary regulatory issues. Giacomo Calzolari (University of Bologna and Center for Economic Policy Research) then provides his views and comments on the argument. The session ends with an interactive Question and Answers session. http://fbf.eui.eu/event/online-seminar-bank-lending-digital-disruption/
Mitu Gulati | Duke University
 
01:07
The new financial architecture in the Eurozone - Conference at the European University Institute - Florence School of Banking and Finance 23rd April 2015
Risk Reduction in the Banking Union: NPLs and Sovereign Debt Concentration
 
59:09
Speakers: Daniel Gros (Director, CEPS) and Willem Pieter De Groen (Research Fellow and Head of Financial Markets and Institutions Unit, CEPS) Recording of the online seminar on 17 April 2018. ‘Risk reduction’ is a key condition to complete the Banking Union. Risk-reduction is understood to refer to two main issues: the treatment of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) and the concentration of sovereign exposure. In this online seminar, Daniel Gros and Willem Pieter De Groen (CEPS) first argue that the stock of NPLs is by now well-known and should no longer be considered a ‘risk’. The only question that remains is whether banks are willing to recognise the losses, today or later. Also, there is little evidence that banks with high NPL ratios lend less. Low capital ratios constitute a more important determinant of lending. Gros and De Groen then claim that the concentration of sovereign exposures (on the domestic sovereign) should be looked at in the context of the overall balance sheet of the banks. They show that banks with different business models in the three major euro area countries (DE, FR and IT) seem to follow very different incentives. On the one hand the countries with more dominant investment banks show less concentration because they rely more on market financing, which would become more expensive if the asset side of their balances shows excessive concentration. On the other hand countries with more retail oriented banks, the yield differential on peripheral government bonds, might be less of an issue at first sight, but becomes more important in the medium to long term when they have to issue bonds to fulfill the MREL requirements. http://fbf.eui.eu/event/online-seminar-risk-reduction-banking-union/
Financial Surveillance - Executive Seminar (5-6 July 2018)
 
04:04
Interviews to Ignazio Angeloni (European Central Bank), Tobias Tröger (Goethe University, Frankfurt), Steffen Kern (European Securities and Markets Authority) and Tom Wilson (Allianz). Interview in Florence on 6 July 2018, in the occasion of the closed-doors Executive Seminar on 'Financial Surveillance'.
Joanna Gray | Single Market versus Eurozone. Panel 3
 
02:31
The new financial architecture in the Eurozone - Conference at the European University Institute - Florence School of Banking and Finance 23rd April 2015
The Future of the Banking Union - Seminar with the European Commission, DG FISMA
 
01:11:12
Recording of the online seminar held on the 10th of November 2017, organised by the Florence School of Banking and Finance. Speakers: Mario Nava (Director, Financial System Surveillance and Crisis Management, DG FISMA, European Commission) Giulia Bertezzolo (Policy officer) Markus Aspegren (Economist) Davide Lombardo (Senior Economist) Moderator: Pierre Schlosser (Florence School of Banking and Finance) This online seminar aims at giving a better understanding of the way the Banking Union is evolving and the ways it should develop in the coming year to be better equipped to cope with future risks. As presented in the recently published European Commission Communication on “Completing the Banking Union”, the seminar will therefore describe and discuss the measures to be adopted to complete the Banking Union and to make the European banking sector more resilient. After a brief introduction on the broader context in which the recent Commission Communication was conceived, speakers will then focus on the three main aspects addressed by the Commission Communication, namely: - The new ideas put forward by the Communication to set up a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) in relation to the system proposed with the legislative proposal of 2015; - Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) in the European banking sector and the measures announced by the Communication to tackle such issue; - The characteristics of Sovereign-Bonds Backed Securities (SBBSs) and their potential usefulness in contributing to the diversification of financial institutions’ portfolios of sovereign bonds. http://fbf.eui.eu/event/online-seminar-future-banking-union/
Liquidity and Resolution
 
01:10:52
Speakers: - Dominique Laboureix (Director of Resolution Planning and Decisions and Member, Single Resolution Board) - Michael Hesketh (Principal Banking Expert, European Stability Mechanism) - Patrick Honohan (Honorary Professor of Economics at Trinity College Dublin; Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics) Recording of the online seminar on 8 February 2019. More information: http://fbf.eui.eu/event/online-seminar-liquidity-and-resolution/ This online seminar will focus on the tension between liquidity and resolution. By definition, once a resolution scheme is adopted, a recapitalised bank that has absorbed losses will be solvent and should have better access to funding. However, liquidity stress is expected at the point of resolution. Given that analysts and creditors will likely require time to re-assess the financial position of the resolved bank, the return to market funding will be a slightly longer process. Resolution authorities have a key role to play to restore market confidence and access to private market funding in case of resolution. Enhancing banks capabilities to restore liquidity at the point of resolution represents a crucial task in resolution planning activities. In some cases, a temporary public funding may be necessary when an immediate return to the market is not fully possible. In that regard, the central banks and the Single Resolution Fund would be instrumental for the success of a resolution action.
Contingent Convertible Debt Instruments (CoCos): regulatory use and market development
 
54:50
Webinar (recording) by Enrico Perotti (Ph.D. MIT), Professor of International Finance at the University of Amsterdam, Member of the Scientific Committee of the Florence School of Banking and Finance and CEPR http://fbf.eui.eu/event/contingent-co... This webinar addresses the new regulatory treatment of Contingent Convertible Debt instruments and the development of the underlying CoCo bond markets. The contractual feature of the existing stock of CoCo debt is analysed along various dimensions. First, in terms of their regulatory effectiveness in absorbing risk. Second, in terms of their impact on risk incentives and thus on their preventive effect. Third, we look at the empirical evidence on the market response to their issuance. Finally, we discuss the recent evolution on the CoCo bond market in terms of issuances and prices.
Do courts vigorously enforce rules during financial crises? Mitu Gulati and Georg Vanberg
 
08:54
Interview with Mitu Gulati (Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law) and Georg Vanberg (Chair of the Department of Political Science at Duke University). Recorded in Florence on 27 April 2018 during the conference 'Institutions and the Crisis'. More info: http://fbf.eui.eu/annual-conference-2018/
Sovereign-bond Backed Securities (SBBS) from theory to practice
 
01:02:39
Recording of the online seminar held on 22 July 2018. Speakers: - Peter Grasmann (Head of Unit, Economic Analysis of Financial Markets and Financial Stability – DG FISMA, European Commission) - Davide Lombardo (Senior Economist, EU/Euro Area Financial Sector Unit – DG FISMA, European Commission This online seminar focuses on the recent Commission proposal for a bespoke regulatory framework for sovereign-bond backed securities (SBBS). A novel concept, SBBS have the potential to contribute to a more resilient Banking Union and a more efficient Capital Markets Union by helping banks and other financial institutions better diversify their sovereign bond portfolios and by expanding the toolkit for private sector risk-sharing, especially across borders. But they face several regulatory hindrances, which result—in a way—from their own being so novel. The recent Commission proposal aims to eliminate such hindrances, thus giving SBBS a chance. Commission officials will present the broad contours of the draft legislation, and will discuss the trade-offs faced when drafting it and the rationale underpinning the various choices made. The presentations will be followed by an interactive Questions and Answers session. More information: http://fbf.eui.eu/event/online-seminar-sbbs-from-theory-to-practice/?instance_id=294
To Fail or Not to Fail? - Seminar with Christos Gortsos and Seraina Grünewald
 
37:40
Recording of the online seminar held on the 5th of July 2017, organised by the Florence School of Banking and Finance. Speaker: Christos Gortsos (National and Kapodistrian University of Athens) Commentator: Seraina Grünewald (University of Zurich) Moderator: Pierre Schlosser (Florence School of Banking and Finance) This seminar discusses the circumstances under which a credit institution is deemed to be ‘failing or likely to fail’. But what does it take for an institution to be deemed failing or likely to fail? Who makes that assessment and how is it conducted? What are the possible courses of action for authorities? The seminar will also recall and further clarify that a resolution scheme is adopted by the Single Resolution Board (SRB) in relation to a credit institution when it assesses that three conditions for resolution are met cumulatively. Lastly, the online seminar will explore lessons learned from (and implications of) the first resolution scheme adopted very recently.
'The Transformation of Global Governance' - Jean Pisani-Ferry
 
49:30
Inaugural lecture of the Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Chair at the EUI, devoted to defining the research and policy questions raised by the transformation of global governance. More information: https://www.eui.eu/events/detail?eventid=148550
Enrique G. Mendoza  | Macroprudential Policy: Promise and Challenges
 
01:04
Enrique G. Mendoza (University of Pennsylvania), speaker at the Florence School of Banking and Finance's training course 'Macroprudential Policy: Promise and Challenges'. For more information about this course please visit: http://fbf.eui.eu/training/macroprudential-policy-promises-challenges/
Capital and Bail in Debt Buffers: Loss Absorption vs Risk Incentives | Enrico Perotti
 
54:57
http://fbf.eui.eu/event/capital-and-bail-in-debt-buffers-loss-absorption-vs-risk-incentives/ This is the first of a two part webinar. This webinar will offer a critical approach to capital requirements with a particular emphasis put on risk absorption capacity in the context of the new Capital Requirements Directive (CRD4) and the Financial Stability Board’s Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) standard. Two alternative views of capital requirements will be lined out: the buffer view and the incentives view. As part of the webinar, the risk absorption potential of equity, bail-in debt and , Contingent Convertible Debt instruments (CoCos) will be explored. Enrico Perotti (Ph.D. MIT) is Professor of International Finance at the University of Amsterdam, Member of the Scientific Committee of the Florence School of Banking and Finance and CEPR). His advisory work has focused on policy advice on issues of banking, financial reforms and stability to the EC, ECB, IMF, DNB, Bank of England, the World Bank and the UK Treasury.
The Future of CoCos - Seminar by Enrico Perotti and Simon Gleeson
 
01:00:17
Recording of the online seminar held on the 1st of March 2017, organised by the Florence School of Banking and Finance. Speaker: Enrico Perotti (University of Amsterdam) Commentator: Simon Gleeson (Clifford Chance, London) Moderator: Pierre Schlosser (Florence School of Banking and Finance) Contingent Convertible bonds – also known as CoCo bonds – have attracted growing attention over the past years, both from regulators and industry practitioners. CoCos can be seen as a creation of the last financial crisis. They are a hybrid security that takes the form of a debt instrument upon issuance that may be turned into equity or written down altogether when a pre-determined trigger is activated. In theory, CoCos thus constitute an ideal risk-absorbing instrument. It provides more agility and flexibility to banks in distress while at the same time – through its preventive effects – improving the resilience of the banking system. But under which exact design conditions can they support ‘going concern’ restructuring and market discipline in practice? Moreover, given the current volatile and unpredictable demand for CoCos in the market, is there a risk that CoCos might contribute instead to financial instability? Looking ahead, will the CoCo market reach maturity any time soon? http://fbf.eui.eu/online-seminar-the-future-of-cocos/
Natacha Valla | CEPII
 
01:16
The new financial architecture in the Eurozone - Conference at the European University Institute - Florence School of Banking and Finance 23rd April 2015
European Banking Union: Democracy, Technocracy and the State of Integration | P. D.  Culpepper - EUI
 
00:59
Conference at the European University Institute on European Banking Union: Democracy, Technocracy and the State of Inte gration Scientific Organisers: Pepper D. Culpepper, Stefan Grundmann, Adrienne Héritier, Hans-W. Micklitz European University Institute Sala Europa, Villa Schifanoia Via Boccaccio, 121 – Firenze 22-23 May 2015 ■ Context In 2012, at the height of the sovereign debt crisis, European decision makers decided that the next step in developing an ever closer union involved the formation of banking union (BU). Now that the banking union has taken shape, this conference will bring together social scientists from several disciplines to discuss the nature of the political processes that gave rise to the banking union. Which players were involved, and with what consequences, in the different stages of the decision-making process? To what extent has there been a trade-off between efficient problem solving, on the one hand, and democratic legitimation through an open political process, on the other? One important goal of the reform was to break the dangerous link between government debt and national banks buying government bonds to finance this debt. In June 2014 member states and the European Parliament decided to create a single resolution mechanism (SRM), the second building block of the BU, after the first step of the single supervision mechanism (SSM) had been introduced in 2013 to create a unified system to handle banks in crisis. The political decision-making that resulted in the two mechanisms involved difficult bargaining between governments with diverging preferences, particularly with respect to the mutual insurance of bank deposits in case of bank failure, but also as regards the distribution of decision-making competences under both the SSM and the SRM. Three conflicts of interest emerged: between debtor and creditor states; between member states favouring a centralization of competences and member states resisting centralization in the supervision and resolution; and between stakeholders of banks and of governments trying to protect the interests of taxpayers. Understanding how the institutional arrangements adopted reflect these tensions, and how these tensions are likely to influence the future functioning of the BU, is a central intellectual concern of the conference. A second major theme is the relationship between technocratic governance and democratic oversight. The SSM was introduced on the basis of a unanimity vote of member states. The European Parliament gave its support after it had been granted more powers than originally envisaged over the appointment of top officials at the new single supervisor and after obtaining better access to information from the ECB in its supervision of banks. In the case of the resolution of failing banks, the decision-process still significantly involves national decision-makers. Burden sharing in rescuing or resolving a failed bank has been watered down. While bail-in rules will first burden bond-holders with more costs of a failure, in a further step member governments will be financially responsible. The mutual rescue fund of 55 billion Euros is relatively small and will be built up over 8 years. The upshot of the modest SRM compromise is that the ECB is indirectly gaining more competences, because it is under more pressure to correctly assess banks balance sheets in the supervision of banks so that they can withstand another shock. The organization of the panels draws on the specific expertise of invited participants to shed light on these general issues at the intersection of law, politics, and economics. A first panel focuses on technocratic and centralized decision making in the BU, emphasizing the process and its particular constitutive element for the building of a new European banking union. The second session considers the inherent constitutional dimension of the project, comparing the BU as a step of constitutionalisation to the EU constitution building after the establishment of the competition order in the 1960s and 1970s. The two afternoon panels on Friday look into the overall systemic impact of the deepening of integration through the BU: what are the consequences for the overall institutional architecture of the EU, in particular as regards the democratic legitimation in the EU? The Saturday panel returns to how the political play of power in building the BU will influence its likely functioning, and the final roundtable takes two different disciplinary perspectives to anticipate the future functioning and potential dysfunctions of the banking union.
Discussing the Greek Crisis: is debt relief inevitable?
 
48:01
Is debt relief inevitable? Does is the crisis mean the banking union was too little too late? Has this crisis exposed a flawed EMU? And who is ultimately responsible for cleaning up this mess? Evi Pappa was born in Athens under the rule of the military junta. She’s now Professor of Macroeconomics at here at the EUI. As is Ramon Marimon, he’s also the scientific coordinator of the Horizon 2020 project “A Dynamic Economic and Monetary Union" (ADEMU) Christos Hadjiemmanuil is Professor of International and European Monetary and Financial Institutions at the University of Piraeus. And Thomas Cooley is Professor of Economics at the Leonard N. Stern School of Business at New York University http://fbf.eui.eu
The Florence School of Banking & Finance
 
02:59
http://fbf.eui.eu/ The Florence School of Banking & Finance is a European platform bringing together practitioners and academics from the Banking and Finance sector to develop a common culture of regulation and supervision in the European Union. It does so through policy debate, training and applied research and in close interaction with its network of leading academic institutions.
The banks and the market – Lecture by Sabine Lautenschläger
 
01:52:32
Lecture held on 15 March 2018, organised by the Florence School of Banking and Finance, in cooperation with Fondazione CESIFIN Alberto Predieri and Fondazione CR Firenze. http://fbf.eui.eu/event/banks-market-lecture-lautenschlager/ In this speech, Sabine Lautenschläger argues that, in a well-functioning banking sector, banks must be able to fail. It is key, however, that they can do so in an orderly manner without destabilizing the entire banking system. Against that backdrop, Ms Lautenschläger discusses the role of the supervisor within the European framework for bank resolution. She also sheds light on the importance of the upcoming European stress test for supervisors’ assessments of banks’ resilience.
European Banking Union Democracy, Technocracy and ... | Stefan Grundmann - EUI
 
01:36
Conference at the European University Institute on European Banking Union: Democracy, Technocracy and the State of Inte gration Scientific Organisers: Pepper D. Culpepper, Stefan Grundmann, Adrienne Héritier, Hans-W. Micklitz European University Institute Sala Europa, Villa Schifanoia Via Boccaccio, 121 – Firenze 22-23 May 2015 ■ Context In 2012, at the height of the sovereign debt crisis, European decision makers decided that the next step in developing an ever closer union involved the formation of banking union (BU). Now that the banking union has taken shape, this conference will bring together social scientists from several disciplines to discuss the nature of the political processes that gave rise to the banking union. Which players were involved, and with what consequences, in the different stages of the decision-making process? To what extent has there been a trade-off between efficient problem solving, on the one hand, and democratic legitimation through an open political process, on the other? One important goal of the reform was to break the dangerous link between government debt and national banks buying government bonds to finance this debt. In June 2014 member states and the European Parliament decided to create a single resolution mechanism (SRM), the second building block of the BU, after the first step of the single supervision mechanism (SSM) had been introduced in 2013 to create a unified system to handle banks in crisis. The political decision-making that resulted in the two mechanisms involved difficult bargaining between governments with diverging preferences, particularly with respect to the mutual insurance of bank deposits in case of bank failure, but also as regards the distribution of decision-making competences under both the SSM and the SRM. Three conflicts of interest emerged: between debtor and creditor states; between member states favouring a centralization of competences and member states resisting centralization in the supervision and resolution; and between stakeholders of banks and of governments trying to protect the interests of taxpayers. Understanding how the institutional arrangements adopted reflect these tensions, and how these tensions are likely to influence the future functioning of the BU, is a central intellectual concern of the conference. A second major theme is the relationship between technocratic governance and democratic oversight. The SSM was introduced on the basis of a unanimity vote of member states. The European Parliament gave its support after it had been granted more powers than originally envisaged over the appointment of top officials at the new single supervisor and after obtaining better access to information from the ECB in its supervision of banks. In the case of the resolution of failing banks, the decision-process still significantly involves national decision-makers. Burden sharing in rescuing or resolving a failed bank has been watered down. While bail-in rules will first burden bond-holders with more costs of a failure, in a further step member governments will be financially responsible. The mutual rescue fund of 55 billion Euros is relatively small and will be built up over 8 years. The upshot of the modest SRM compromise is that the ECB is indirectly gaining more competences, because it is under more pressure to correctly assess banks balance sheets in the supervision of banks so that they can withstand another shock. The organization of the panels draws on the specific expertise of invited participants to shed light on these general issues at the intersection of law, politics, and economics. A first panel focuses on technocratic and centralized decision making in the BU, emphasizing the process and its particular constitutive element for the building of a new European banking union. The second session considers the inherent constitutional dimension of the project, comparing the BU as a step of constitutionalisation to the EU constitution building after the establishment of the competition order in the 1960s and 1970s. The two afternoon panels on Friday look into the overall systemic impact of the deepening of integration through the BU: what are the consequences for the overall institutional architecture of the EU, in particular as regards the democratic legitimation in the EU? The Saturday panel returns to how the political play of power in building the BU will influence its likely functioning, and the final roundtable takes two different disciplinary perspectives to anticipate the future functioning and potential dysfunctions of the banking union.
Banking on Bail-in
 
01:15:17
Speakers: - Wilson Ervin (Vice Chairman, Group Executive Office, Credit Suisse Group AG – New York) - Patrick Honohan (Honorary Professor of Economics at Trinity College Dublin; Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics) - Stefano Cappiello (Deputy Director, Florence School of Banking and Finance) Recording of the online seminar on 9 October 2018. More information: http://fbf.eui.eu/event/banking-on-bail-in/ We are now 10 years after the seminal Lehman event, which was followed rapidly by other failures, bailouts and ‘shotgun’ marriages of the Great Financial Crisis. With hindsight, have we built effective solutions to the issues of bank failures and systemic risk? The discussion will explore what’s in place today – both on a conceptual policy level, and whether those solutions pass a credibility test for effectiveness now. Finally, it will explore the remaining issues – the ‘to do’ list – and ask what are the key policy risks, and how we can address them. The online seminar will look at cross-border issues – both international and intra EU – and will spend some time on the relationship between bail-in and the Banking Union.
The Road to a European Monetary Fund - Rolf Strauch (ESM) and Marcello Messori (LUISS Guido Carli)
 
01:05:02
Recording of the online seminar on 2 May 2018. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was established during the euro crisis to fill a gap in the institutional set-up of the monetary union: that of a lender of last resort for sovereigns. Several other reforms were also undertaken in that period, both at the national and at the supranational level. As a result, the euro area is now much stronger than before the crisis, both economically and institutionally. But a number of weaknesses to make EMU more robust still need to be fixed. In the debate about deepening the monetary union, a wider role for the ESM is one of the ideas under discussion. In this online seminar, Rolf Strauch (ESM) will argue that developing a European Monetary Fund (EMF) is not a goal in itself, but could help to make the euro area economy more resilient. Various new functions are under discussion. Strauch will explain that there is a widespread consensus that these functions would be economically useful, and will stress that it is important not to miss this unique political opportunity to further integrate the monetary union. Marcello Messori (School of European Political Economy, LUISS) will then provide his views and comments on the argument. As always the session will end with an interactive Question and Answers session. http://fbf.eui.eu/event/online-seminar-road-to-european-monetary-fund/
European Banking Union Democracy, Technocracy and ... | Hanz W  Micklitz - EUI
 
01:02
Conference at the European University Institute on European Banking Union: Democracy, Technocracy and the State of Inte gration Scientific Organisers: Pepper D. Culpepper, Stefan Grundmann, Adrienne Héritier, Hans-W. Micklitz European University Institute Sala Europa, Villa Schifanoia Via Boccaccio, 121 – Firenze 22-23 May 2015 ■ Context In 2012, at the height of the sovereign debt crisis, European decision makers decided that the next step in developing an ever closer union involved the formation of banking union (BU). Now that the banking union has taken shape, this conference will bring together social scientists from several disciplines to discuss the nature of the political processes that gave rise to the banking union. Which players were involved, and with what consequences, in the different stages of the decision-making process? To what extent has there been a trade-off between efficient problem solving, on the one hand, and democratic legitimation through an open political process, on the other? One important goal of the reform was to break the dangerous link between government debt and national banks buying government bonds to finance this debt. In June 2014 member states and the European Parliament decided to create a single resolution mechanism (SRM), the second building block of the BU, after the first step of the single supervision mechanism (SSM) had been introduced in 2013 to create a unified system to handle banks in crisis. The political decision-making that resulted in the two mechanisms involved difficult bargaining between governments with diverging preferences, particularly with respect to the mutual insurance of bank deposits in case of bank failure, but also as regards the distribution of decision-making competences under both the SSM and the SRM. Three conflicts of interest emerged: between debtor and creditor states; between member states favouring a centralization of competences and member states resisting centralization in the supervision and resolution; and between stakeholders of banks and of governments trying to protect the interests of taxpayers. Understanding how the institutional arrangements adopted reflect these tensions, and how these tensions are likely to influence the future functioning of the BU, is a central intellectual concern of the conference. A second major theme is the relationship between technocratic governance and democratic oversight. The SSM was introduced on the basis of a unanimity vote of member states. The European Parliament gave its support after it had been granted more powers than originally envisaged over the appointment of top officials at the new single supervisor and after obtaining better access to information from the ECB in its supervision of banks. In the case of the resolution of failing banks, the decision-process still significantly involves national decision-makers. Burden sharing in rescuing or resolving a failed bank has been watered down. While bail-in rules will first burden bond-holders with more costs of a failure, in a further step member governments will be financially responsible. The mutual rescue fund of 55 billion Euros is relatively small and will be built up over 8 years. The upshot of the modest SRM compromise is that the ECB is indirectly gaining more competences, because it is under more pressure to correctly assess banks balance sheets in the supervision of banks so that they can withstand another shock. The organization of the panels draws on the specific expertise of invited participants to shed light on these general issues at the intersection of law, politics, and economics. A first panel focuses on technocratic and centralized decision making in the BU, emphasizing the process and its particular constitutive element for the building of a new European banking union. The second session considers the inherent constitutional dimension of the project, comparing the BU as a step of constitutionalisation to the EU constitution building after the establishment of the competition order in the 1960s and 1970s. The two afternoon panels on Friday look into the overall systemic impact of the deepening of integration through the BU: what are the consequences for the overall institutional architecture of the EU, in particular as regards the democratic legitimation in the EU? The Saturday panel returns to how the political play of power in building the BU will influence its likely functioning, and the final roundtable takes two different disciplinary perspectives to anticipate the future functioning and potential dysfunctions of the banking union.
Elena Carletti - Interview 15 March 2018
 
01:38
Elena Carletti, Scientific Director of the Florence School of Banking and Finance, interviewed on the School during the lecture by Sabine Lautenschläger 'The banks and the market'. Palazzo Incontri, Florence, 15 March 2018 http://fbf.eui.eu/event/banks-market-lecture-lautenschlager